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Abstract 
In this paper, we argue that industrial innovation processes can productively be analyzed as 
consisting of two sub-processes that over time create and mobilize contrary forces within both 
internal and external interactions of the innovation project. One of these forces emerges from 
the process of mobilizing resources, activities, and actors in ensuring commitments to the 
project over time. The other is the process of explorative learning, which continues to create 
revised or even new propositions about the realities of the project and its opportunities. We 
argue that this analytical distinction permits us to expand our understanding of how friction 
forces develop over time in business networks (Håkansson & Waluszewski, 2001ab), the 
patterns of divergence and convergence in innovation processes as identified by Van de Ven 
et al. (1999) and the processes of “path creation through mindful deviation” as argued by 
Garud and Karnøe (2001). 
 
 
 
 
 
1. Introduction 
Innovation processes represent a particular challenge to IMP theory, since it has emerged 
from a greater focus on understanding why businesses tend to be much more intertwined in 
relatively stable collaborative networks. Given the dominance of interrelatedness, 
interdependency and stability across many business landscapes, observed radical changes and 
innovations must also be properly accounted for. To do this, a particular concept of ‘friction’ 
has been introduced by Håkansson and Waluszewski (2001b), which identifies tension 
between the forces of the elements that have been put in place and the forces of any 
movements, changes and efforts that interact with such an established order (Håkansson & 
Waluszewski, 2001b). In this paper, we aim to further investigate what some of these 
controversies are made of. In order to accomplish this, we have applied Actor-Network 
Theory (ANT) as an analytical approach for dealing with and explaining ‘emerging 
phenomena’, such as innovations. In particular we utilize ANT’s attention to controversy and 
alliance-building; the assumption that networks emerge out of the more or less conflictual 
processes of overcoming resistance, and the semiotic principle of entities being entirely a 
result of their relations. ANT has also been used by other IMP researchers, with the aim of 
combining the two approaches in order to better explain change and innovation in business 
networks (Mattsson, 2003; Araujo, 2007; Brekke, 2009; Hoholm, 2011).  
 
This paper is based on a detailed case study of a fairly complex food-product innovation 
project called ‘Salma’, which was jointly created by the Norwegian dairy company Tine SA, 
and the seafood company Bremnes Seashore AS, from 2005 through 2008. Based on this 
study, we suggest that the most crucial frictions and confrontations that we observe 
throughout the innovation process can be productively analyzed as a dynamic and 
controversial interplay between two kinds of processes. One of these processes has to do with 
the efforts to mobilize resources, activities and actors by means of including them into 
particular framings which represent visions about rewarding future states, and through 
arguments that are meant to convince others to commit to the project. The other process is the 
process of learning, referred to here as ‘knowledge exploration’, by those working toward the 
project’s materialization. Learning evolves through a combination of discoveries, positive and 
negative feedback, and creation of additional creative propositions about the true state of the 
innovation and what represents the most promising routes by which the project might 
advance. New framings are created, different actors and resources interact, and new 
arguments are being generated to pull the innovation project in alternative directions. Over 
time, these two processes typically evolve into different paths, where they later confront each 
other in new battles for resources and activities. They also vie over the commitment of the 
existing participants to the future process. The outcome of such controversies depends on the 
ability of each of the alternatives to mobilize support, practical solutions and arguments in 
favour of some alternative as well as on their ability to undermine the existing or other rival 
alternatives. In particular, turning around a previously established framing – with committed 
resources, activities and actors – typically involves deliberate efforts to undermine it. This is 
often done through rejecting or deconstructing some of its core elements or propositions, by 
mobilizing findings extracted from new learning processes. 
 
We argue that structuring the analysis into this kind of bipolar process model leads to a more 
extended, realistic and precise understanding of how networked innovation processes evolve. 
It also reveals patterns that characterize the relationship between relatively stable business 
networks and the innovation phenomena we observe. It provides a better understanding of the 
mechanisms associated with some of the friction phenomena pointed out by others, expands 
the vocabulary to include ‘confrontation’, and enhances our understanding of the 
controversies that are central to the divergence-convergence pattern of the innovation 
processes described by Van de Ven, Polley, Garud and Venkataraman (1999). Finally, we 
argue that the interaction between mobilizing and explorative processes provides an 
interesting alternative approach to, or expansion of, the “path creation through mindful 
deviation” approach argued by Garud and Karnøe (2001). 
 
2. Knowledge gap and research questions 
A substantial body of research has contributed to our understanding of business landscapes as 
being dominated by interactive business networks forming relatively stable structures over 
time (Håkansson et al., 2009). Even as we acknowledge this as a dominant characteristic of 
the business world, we still need to understand the processes of change, innovation, growth, 
decline, etc. Understanding the mechanisms of relatively stable, interacted business networks 
does not necessarily include an understanding of how they come about in the first place, of 
how they may change, dissolve or evolve over time, or of how entirely new or different 
networks may establish themselves among all those that are already there. We suggest that the 
concept of ‘friction’ (Håkansson & Waluszewski, 2001ab) based on the IMP understanding of 
embedded resources, can be fruitfully combined with a focus on controversies, and 
particularly what we call ‘confrontations’ in the relational view of network formation that can 
be found in actor-network theory (Latour, 1987). We argue that this combination of concepts 
and focus may help enhance our understanding and theorizing of networked innovation 
processes. 
 
2.1 IMP and interactive innovation processes 
How, then, is interaction conceived of within the ‘interaction and business network 
approach’? First, actors do not seem to have free choice, due to their social and material 
relationships to others. Interactions are necessary to “be a business”, and to get anything done 
at all. Still, when a real choice exists, interaction is sought for different reasons, including 
problem-solving, learning, innovation, efficiency or cost reductions (Ritter & Ford, 2004). 
Ford, Gadde, Håkansson and Snehota (2003:7-8) have employed the term ‘networking’ as a 
synonym to interaction in business networks, claiming that all companies engage in 
networking by means of “suggesting, requesting, requiring, performing and adapting 
activities, simultaneously”. However, networks are often considered to be quite stable and 
difficult to change. The reason for this is said to be the result “of complex interactions, 
adaptations and investments within and between the companies over time” (Håkansson & 
Ford, 2002:133).  
 
Johansson and Mattsson (1987) divide interaction into two categories, namely exchange and 
adaptation. In order to capture the interactional aspects of these categories, time needs to be 
included as a factor (Medlin, 2002, 2004; Dubois & Araujo, 2004; Ritter & Ford, 2004), 
because there seems to be a difference between exchanges that happen in the present, and 
adaptations that are being “planned in the present, exist as changes to resource ties and 
activity links in the future” (Medlin, 2002:7). Both concepts are closely related to past 
experience, present interaction context and future expectations. It would also be difficult to 
study emergent properties of networks, e.g., innovation, without devoting attention to time 
and timing (Quintens & Matthyssens, 2010). Overall, this resembles a research perspective 
investigating “the social creation of reality through interaction” over time (Medlin, 2002:4). 
Some authors have put resources (Waluszewski, 2004; Håkansson & Waluszewski, 2001a), 
and more specifically, knowledge, (Araujo, 2003; Håkansson & Waluszewski, 2007) at the 
centre of their analyses. In interactions, possibilities for finding new solutions are created, and 
old resource combinations are confronted with new alternatives, producing additional 
variation based on having knowledge about different combinations (Waluszewski, 2004:146).  
 
In their inquiry into why and how technological systems are so often difficult to change, 
Håkansson & Waluszewski (2001a) oppose the notion of ‘inertia’. Instead, they introduce the 
concept of ‘friction’ as representing a much more active force. They observed how resources 
across companies often seemed to be ‘cemented’ upon each other, and were therefore hard to 
change or replace, and yet resource combinations with seemingly unlimited stability 
sometimes suddenly dissolved. They defined friction as a relational concept, describing the 
relative force directed at each of the two interacting entities, causing them to mobilise across 
their interfaces. It is viewed as a transformational force, in that friction not only leads to 
movement, but also to transformations of the interacting entities. Furthermore, friction forces 
interact across historical and contemporary processes, and thereby lead to neither random nor 
deterministic change processes. Friction is viewed as an ‘active force’ in resource interaction, 
causing changes in existing resource combinations, with a strong tendency to favour existing 
(i.e. historical) values due to their accumulated weight – or ‘economic heaviness’ (Håkansson 
& Waluszewski, 2001b). Hence, although it includes the material and social aspects of 
resources, ‘friction’ is first and foremost an economic argument. 
 
With regard to the effects of friction, it is argued that forces directed towards one resource 
will also affect all of the other resources with which it interacts. Hence, attention is directed 
toward indirect effects that are never merely local; such effects distribute across interfaces to 
other resources – also transforming them. It is further argued that such indirect effects are 
often more important than the direct effects (Håkansson, Kraus & Lind, 2010). One reason for 
the observed stabilisation effects in industrial networks is that friction connects the present 
with the past, thereby defending previous results and solutions (Wagrell & Waluszewski, 
2009). This is a process of bringing historical entities together, as well as integrating new 
interfaces with existing ones in emerging interrelated networks (Håkansson & Waluszewski, 
2001b:15). On the other hand, friction also produces de-stabilisation effects. Through friction, 
simultaneous processes are connected, allowing the same interface to be activated in several 
change processes. In this way, friction can also sometimes enforce change (ibid: 17).  
 
Waluszewski (2004), Håkansson & Waluszewski (2001), Leek, Turnbull and Naude (2003), 
Medlin (2002, 2004) and Dubois & Araujo (2004) all call for the development of theoretical 
‘tools’ to better analyze the dynamic aspects of networks. In starting out from studying 
established industrial network relationships and their relative stability and incremental 
changes, the IMP literature has left a gap in theorizing network formation and innovation. 
However, the emergence of networks and of innovation – whether in science or technology – 
is a core matter for Actor-Network Theory (ANT) research. Further, Mattsson (2003) and 
Araujo (1998) suggest that ANT could enrich and complement the IMP approach by 
explicating how human and non-human actors are related, and how social phenomena are 
‘performed’ in emerging and heterogeneous networks, and by offering a more precise 
methodology for studying dynamics. Mattsson (2003) also suggests that ANT could benefit 
from the accumulated knowledge of the IMP approach when directing its focus towards 
economic and market phenomena. 
 
2.2 Actor-network theory and the study of emergence 
The particular strand of Science and Technology Studies (STS) called ANT has sought to 
describe and understand the rise, continuity and fall of socio-material networks, in viewing 
them as relational, heterogeneous and emergent. According to ANT, the social is unstable and 
unpredictable, as any actor can, and often will, resist the exercise of power by others. Actors 
who are able to recruit others to their network by selling their discourse and making them 
dependent upon their knowledge, discourse and mode of ordering, will succeed in building 
their network, at least for a while. This is fundamentally a relational and process perspective 
(Olsen, 2011), viewing the world as in constant flux, and hence putting stability – and 
stabilisation – under scrutiny. This provides an interesting basis for studying innovation 
processes over time1
 
.  
ANT maintains that “entities take their form and acquire their attributes as a result of their 
relations with other entities” (Law, 1999:2). Ontologically and epistemologically, ANT views 
reality as relational, and, as a consequence, as multiple and variable. Actors2
 
 must renegotiate 
positions and roles, mediate the expectations of different networks, and relate to truths in one 
network that are irrelevant in another. In several studies about knowledge production and 
innovation, Latour (1988, 1996) has demonstrated how knowledge is never just ‘flowing’, 
‘diffusing’ or being ‘transferred’ through the system. Instead, he introduces the concept of 
‘translation’, arguing that the object is always changing on its way, and not moving by itself. 
It is always up to the individual actor to decide whether to pass it on or not, in what way and 
in what form. Latour’s (1988, 1999) concept of networks is accordingly one that emphasises 
‘work’ more than ‘net’. He argues that networks should be understood as processes of 
translation, association, deformation and transformation. This implies that networks a priori 
are unpredictable phenomena. The possibility of controlling networks in time and space is 
always questionable, and to deal with this variability ANT has developed a conceptual theory 
where power to influence and control others results from the work to relate and stabilize 
heterogeneous entities so that they together have persuasive effects. Hence, power is 
represented by networked – or chained – power-elements, and depends on the stability of the 
core elements as well as the ability of the given actor-network to hold the entire chain of 
power-elements together (Latour, 1991). Law (1992) adds that network ordering is also a 
matter of the uncertain process of overcoming resistance, and, similarly, Pickering (1995:22) 
describes the production of practice as “a dialectic of resistance and accommodation”. In 
fleshing out pathways to a process perspective in organisation studies, Hernes (2007) sums up 
three implications of an ANT approach. First, no social order can endure over time, except via 
socio-material relations (Hernes, 2007:72). Second, these heterogeneous networks are kept 
together in and via recursive patterns that are repeated in time and space. Third, this means 
that entities (actors, resources, innovations, etc) are the outcomes of their relations. However, 
Hernes says little about the resistances and limitations that actors experience when trying to 
order things into (new) patterns, whether such resistances come from materials or practices 
(Mørk, Hoholm & Aanestad, 2006), politics of expertise (Mørk, Hoholm, Aanestad, Edwin & 
Ellingsen, 2010) or interaction in more extended networks (Håkansson & Waluszewski 2007).  
We view the conceptualization of resource interaction in IMP theory and the basic semiotic 
logic of ANT as being fundamentally congruent in being similarly based in a relational, 
emergent, and process view of the world. Yet, they have emerged with focuses on different 
phenomena and with different academic opponents, and they have developed different sets of 
                                                 
1 For this special issue on time and process, it can be noted that from such a relational and process oriented logic, 
time is less of an explanatory factor than the outcome of the network building activities of the involved actors. 
Hence, time is interesting to study not as a cause, but as an effect of networking. Hence, the timing of action, as 
well as how different activity patterns influences time in different contexts, would need to be studied further.  
2 The ‘actor’ in actor-network theory might easily mislead unfamiliar readers; everything that acts is assigned 
actor-status, resources included, and hence ANT resembles more than the logic of IMP’s resource interaction 
perspective. 
vocabulary and operational analytical constructs. Even so, we see no necessary paradigmatic 
obstacles to combining the two.3
 
 While ANT seeks to study network formation by following 
controversies and how they are solved (or not), and IMP theory has conceptualized friction for 
similar purposes, it is worth noting that the ‘controversies’ and ‘confrontations’ as captured 
by ANT logic, and the ‘friction forces’ captured by IMP have somewhat different 
connotations.  Friction forces refer to the economic dimension; specifically, regardless of 
whether all controversies among related actors are resolved, investments in place can still 
create friction forces which compel the innovation process to be more economically 
conservative. This industrial economic aspect of organizational networks and the 
conservatism of past investments in resources are consistent with Utterback and Abernathy’s 
(1978) argument about the impact of ‘investments in place’ in the innovation process. 
However, this is not well understood within ANT, which has mostly studied scientific and 
technological practices, and only recently turned their focus toward the economic sphere 
(Callon, 1999). On the other hand, ANT has to a greater extent conceptualized strategic 
aspects, or what they call ‘programmes of action’, where preferences, intentions, interests and 
power are emergent properties of collective negotiations and coalition building. Different 
programs of this sort frequently confront and challenge one another, particularly during the 
shaping of innovative solutions. Thus, we suggest that these perspectives can be combined to 
get a clearer view of innovation being characterized by social, political and economic roots. 
By combining the understanding of industrial economic networks, particularly the friction 
concept from IMP, with the consistent relational logic of ANT, particularly the attention to 
controversy and the understanding of durability as an effect of developing socio-material 
relations, we argue that it is possible to gain a better understanding of some central 
mechanisms of industrial innovation processes. Before outlining our conceptual framework, 
and demonstrating its analytic value through a case study, we will visit some contributions to 
the process oriented innovation management literature, and thereby position our contribution 
to knowledge of industrial innovation. 
2.3 Innovation management and process studies 
Innovation process studies have been conducted in a variety of research camps across the 
management sciences. Kline and Rosenberg (1986) researched the intertwining of technology 
and economy in innovation processes. They claimed that economists had black-boxed the 
process of technical transformation, while technologists often failed to take the ‘external 
forces of the marketplace’ into consideration.  From this perspective, innovation is a complex 
and uncertain process, and an “exercise in the management and reduction of uncertainty” 
(ibid: 276). A few years later, Von Hippel (1988) became a major proponent of considering 
the market – in the form of users – as internal to the innovation process, granting full 
interactivity to those  ‘users’, who influence  the innovation and its fate by using, modifying 
and/or rejecting it. According to Pavitt, only two aspects of the innovation process are 
generic: “coordinating and integrating specialised knowledge, and learning under conditions 
of uncertainty” (Pavitt, 2005:109). The risk of failure in innovation processes will increase 
“with the number of practices and competencies that need to be changed” (Pavitt, 2005:105). 
Innovation typically consists of contingent processes, stemming from interaction between 
science, technology and markets, and thereby representing high levels of uncertainty. 
                                                 
3  We acknowledge that there are several ontological and epistemological views represented among IMP 
researchers. For example, Easton (e.g. 2010) has made an argument for basing IMP and industrial marketing 
research on critical realism, which is a somewhat different position to our ’constructivist’ position. This is an 
interesting discussion that we cannot address within the scope and spatial limits of this paper. Still, we maintain 
that IMP’s conception of resource interaction is congruent with Actor-network theory. See Hoholm (2011) for an 
extended discussion. 
 
The longitudinal comparative studies of innovation in the Minnesota Innovation Research 
Project (MIRP), reported in Van de Ven et al. (1999), has become a major point of reference 
for anyone studying innovation processes. Their main thesis is that the common pattern of all 
innovation processes is “a nonlinear cycle of divergent and convergent behaviours that may 
repeat itself over time and reflect itself at different organisational levels” (Van de Ven et al., 
1999:213). The ability to manage complexity is viewed as being crucial for success. Again, 
learning is considered to be a key aspect of the process, where ‘learning by discovery’ is 
understood as “an expanding and diverging process”, and learning by testing as “a narrowing 
and converging process” (ibid: 203). Their data demonstrate how a given innovation path 
typically diverts into multiple paths of exploration directed towards different perceptions of 
economic opportunity. In their study, they also found that managers’ performance criteria 
shifted over time, both in relation to outcome, process and input, and in line with the changing 
needs of the innovation process, as well as the unexpected events that occurred. Such changes 
“triggered innovation managers and entrepreneurs to redefine their innovation ideas and 
strategies” (Van de Ven et al., 1999:42). Seen as controversies these observations are 
concerned with fighting over alternative framings, orders of meaning and deciding where the 
innovation should be directed. Beunza and Stark (2004) and Howard-Grenville and Carlile 
(2006) support  this argument, in showing how the negotiation of evaluation criteria is 
fundamentally a political process through which power relations are changed and re-
constituted over time. In order to succeed with innovation, it is necessary to acquire and build 
persuasive chains of power via coalition building.  
 
Garud and Rappa (1994) observed how beliefs were externalised by creating routines, which 
in turn were used to evaluate the technology in a self-reinforcing circle. However, the 
influence went both ways, as the technical artefacts also severely impacted what types of 
evaluation routines could be employed. On the ‘positive’ side of technologists’ blinkers, 
Garud and Karnøe (2001) have investigated the role of (and space for) agency in shaping new 
technical paths. They argue that ‘mindful deviation’ is a central characteristic of how 
entrepreneurs contribute to ‘path creation’, and thus towards implementing new ideas in the 
economy. However, none of this really explains how and why controversies, confrontations 
and frictions emerge, how they are important, or how and why particular pathways get chosen 
before others. Hence, it is still quite unclear how stability and change are related in innovation 
processes. 
 
2.4  Research questions 
Latour (1987; 1996) explicitly advises the researcher to trace controversies, since this is 
where the ‘black-boxes’ are destabilising, and hence enable an observation of how ‘new’ 
socio-technical networks come about. In order to identify a suitable case, we elaborated on 
Van de Ven et al.’s (1999) definition of a ‘generic innovation journey’, emphasising 
innovation processes whose purpose is to develop a novel idea, yet constitute substantial 
uncertainty regarding the market, technology and organisation. Furthermore, they emphasise 
processes that entail a collective effort over time, and require greater resources than those 
possessed by the people who undertook the efforts (Van de Ven et al., 1999:22). This 
resembles the IMP’s argument for making relationships the unit of analysis, as well as the call 
for more studies of the dynamics of interaction (e.g. Ford & Håkansson, 2006).  
 
As shown in the literature review, innovation processes are highly interactive, involving a 
number of both human and non-human elements, where the outcome – on almost any 
parameter – is not given at the outset.  
 
We posed research questions that could help us capture at least some of these aspects, and we 
started out with two premises: (1) From IMP we learned that ‘new’ entities are never created 
out of the blue; they will always be derived from something that already exists (past activities 
and investments). (2) From ANT and its ‘material semiotics’ we might say that it is the 
association that is new: Ideas of how to re-combine, translate or transform existing entities 
into something new. Thus, the research questions we pursued were as follows:  
- How do interactive innovation processes evolve over time?  
- How is knowledge translated, transformed and combined in processes of innovation?  
- What are the contrary forces (frictions) of innovation processes?  
 
In starting out by acknowledging the presence of controversies in innovation, we wanted to 
understand more about what dynamics produce and fuel the inherent tensions of innovation 
processes. Further, we seek to understand how these dynamics influence the process, and how 
the conflicts are settled. ‘Knowledge’ is here understood and studied in a particular way: it is 
only analyzed in terms of how it is materialised in technologies and work practices. The focus 
is on knowing, or the doing of knowledge. It is a performative construct inseparable from the 
historical, social and technological setting in which it is embedded (Law, 1994; Araujo, 
1998). Moreover, innovation is about the entire process, from an idea’s inception until its 
eventual implementation/commercialisation (or failure). 
 
2.5 Methods 
The case study was part of one of the author’s  PhD-projects, and was mostly conducted  as 
real-time ethnography (Hammersley & Atkinson, 1995), which entails observing the actual 
processes as they happened in order to produce ‘thick descriptions’ (Geertz, 1973). We have 
therefore been able to reconstruct the innovation process without some of the well-known 
methodological problems of post-hoc rationalization and ‘closure’ of the story by the involved 
actors (Law, 2004; Watson, 2011; Hoholm & Araujo 2011). In addition, it was necessary to 
trace parts of the process back in time via document analysis and interviews, because it turned 
out that certain historical events became important to the subsequent process (Hammersley & 
Atkinson, 1995; Quintens & Matthyssens, 2010). Several months were spent conducting 
participant observation at the focus firm (Tine BA, a Norwegian dairy company). Over that 
period 35 formal semi-structured and open-ended interviews were conducted (including both 
corporate management and a set of partnering actors), and all available project documentation 
was examined. Ethnographic field notes were written during participant observation, and all 
interviews were taped and transcribed. The analysis was a circular process, moving back and 
forth between literature and empirical data, searching for ‘patterns, contrasts and paradoxes’ 
(Coffey & Atkinson, 1996). The model presented and discussed in this paper was constructed 
as an outcome of this process (Visconti, 2010), and then used to interpret the case and pull out 
the implications for innovation process research and practice (Hoholm, 2011). 
 
3. The case study setting 
Agriculture has developed into a highly industrialized and an increasingly global sector. Tine 
SA has for decades been the dominant actor in the protected Norwegian market, although it is 
increasingly experiencing pressure from international competitors. Hence, it has identified 
innovation to be crucial to its future success. While the seafood sector is transforming more 
towards cultivation than catch, industrialisation of processing, and also product development; 
marketing has not yet taken full advantage of this increased control over the raw material. 
Tine R&D had already been working on a few bio-marine projects, seeking to combine 
ingredients from milk and seafood in various ways, e.g., applying marine oils in dairy 
products.  
 
What we will describe is the emergence of a possibility: the possibility of radically advancing 
into the production and marketing of unique seafood products, and several very early attempts 
at doing so. We traced the departure of the process back to Professor Slinde at the Institute of 
Marine Research in Bergen, a creative scientist who tried to use a technology known from 
agricultural products; fermentation, to help advance industrialization of fish. Tine SA sought 
new opportunities for business in the bio-marine area to expand on the back of its established 
knowledge and technologies within the dairy industry. In addition, Bremnes Seashore, a 
seafood farming company, looked for ways to generate more economic value from its 
investments into new technologies for processing of supreme quality salmon. Along with a 
research group from the University of Environment and Life Sciences at Ås, Bremnes 
Seashore between 1993 and 2004 had invested around 40 million NOK into developing 
technologies for slaughtering and processing salmon, however, this failed to yield positive 
economic rewards during that period. Hence, they sought out partners that could help them 
commercialise on the new technology. Then Tine arrived on the scene, representing an 
opportunity for them to acquire a share of agricultural competence and infrastructure for 
product development. 
 
The product that during this process came to be named ‘SALMA Cured’ was in the most 
basic sense a combination of fish as raw material and fermentation as technology. Traditional 
salami recipes served as the point of departure for the project. However, in the end, the 
product that the consumer could find at restaurants and in supermarkets was very different: 
‘SALMA Fresh’, loins of high-end quality salmon. Still, the story behind this product is much 
more complex than the neatly designed transparent package of high-end salmon would 
suggest. It is a socio-material drama consisting of several partly overlapping episodes4
 
, in 
which the actors struggled to cope with a broad set of challenges. 
4. The case study: The making of Salma 
The story can be said to begin with a single researcher within the food sciences. Having 
worked as a scientist both at the Food Research Institute and at the Institute of Marine 
Research, Professor Slinde wanted to encourage product development of fish: “Let’s take 
some food technologies, and then apply them to fish, using fish as raw material, and using 
agro-food processes, and one of the processes that I know really well is production of salami. 
I thought to myself, ok, we can make a salami out of fish” (Prof. Slinde, Institute of Marine 
Research). From this experimental recombination of technologies and materials, the idea of 
making salami out of fish was tested. It soon became clear that the high fat content in salmon 
(between 10 and 30%) would be a technical challenge. To enable stabilization of the fluid 
fatty acids, a mix of red and white fish was deemed necessary. In addition, white fish, such as 
saithe, was much cheaper than salmon. The first experiments did not go very well. Yet, even 
though he thought of the experiment as a failure, Slinde still brought the results back to his 
fellows at ForInnova, the University of Bergen’s Technology Transfer Office, and the 
Norwegian Research Council: “And then I went back home, and arrived with these nice 
packages, right, a little like ‘decorating the bride’. And these guys ate it, and said it tasted 
delicious. So, I thought that, if three economists are sitting here telling that this is good stuff, 
then I am sure I can make it better” (Prof. Slinde, Institute of Marine Research). 
                                                 
4 For the complete case study, see Hoholm (2011).  
 
Slinde’s interpretation of the situation, even in hindsight, was ambiguous. On the one hand, 
the first experiments failed, and he was actually heading home without positive results. Still, 
just to be able to show something, he ‘decorated’ the fish salami and let the businessmen have 
a taste. One of the Research Council representatives later said he thought the product tasted 
“awful”, but that they thought it was a fascinating project. Some of them had a good 
relationship with Slinde. Thus, it was decided he should conduct further experiments and start 
developing a business plan for the project. After more testing, and finding that the technology 
would be feasible, Slinde filed a patent application. Along with the technology transfer office, 
Slinde started presenting his invention at national and international food fairs to find partners 
or to sell the patent. The dairy cooperative Tine had been collaborating with him in the early 
product development stages through one of their researchers and by supplying some 
ingredients. After some time, Tine decided to buy the patent application and start a project 
they called “Umi No Kami”, for product development and commercialization of fermented 
fish products. 
 
Umi No Kami had to get a professional team of people involved: scientists, technologists and 
people with expertise in marketing and design. In addition, it was strictly tied in with Tine’s 
innovation strategy, hence also involving the top-management when setting or changing the 
direction of the project. The objective was ambitious: “The purpose is to develop a series of 
fish products that take part in creating a whole new category of fermented and dried fish 
products in the food markets that are profitable, and that the consumer wants. The product is 
to be sold both in Norway and internationally” (Status report, Umi No Kami 2003-06-20, 
Tine R&D). They knew the project would require time and money, and to legitimate this use 
of resources, expectations of great profit had to be demonstrated. The first hypothesis had 
been (partly) confirmed: it was possible to make salami out of fish. Now the issue was about 
making the product edible and stable in production. 
 
4.1 Is it possible to get better raw material quality? 
Based on their experience from the agricultural industry, the project team was conscious of 
the microbiological challenges associated with the product, and another hypothesis emerged:  
raw material quality can both improve stability in production and make the product more 
edible. From this perspective, the supply of fish – especially white fish – was a severe 
problem. Several suppliers were tested, and the team worked with some of them over time to 
have them improve the microbiological quality of their processing, but did not succeed. This 
led the technical project participants through a long exploration process. First, raw material 
variation was explored by testing different combinations of saithe and salmon, along with 
tests of several other white fish species. Second, they experimented with frozen raw materials 
to enhance the drying process. Third, they pushed harder to obtain from their supplier a higher 
microbiological standard (i.e. hygiene). Finally, the alternative idea of using only salmon – or 
at least as much salmon as possible – remained an option, even though costs were 
substantially higher.  
 
In order to manage the problem of fat content in a pure salmon product, near-infrared 
spectroscopy (NIR) was launched as a tool to sort out fish with low fat content. Swensen, a 
researcher who had been working with NIR-technology at the University of Life Sciences, 
was hired. Controlling the fat percentage in the fish was thereby improved, but then only the 
best parts of the fish could be used. This was very different from meat salami where low 
quality trimmings are commonly used in the recipe. After two to three years of research, the 
product developers could be quite specific about the transfer of this meat technology to fish. 
While the bacteria culture worked in a similar way with fish as well as the subsequent pH- 
and drying processes, stabilising fat was a lot more complex with fish. They needed to strictly 
control the fat content, add proteins to encapsulate and stabilise the fatty acids, and use fresh 
premium raw materials instead of frozen trimmings. In sum, these were significant changes 
needed to adapt the technology to fish, resulting in the product being both more expensive and 
more challenging to produce. 
 
4.2 What is ‘fish salami’? 
Next there was the question of the market. Should the product be targeted towards the 
exclusive ‘gourmet’ segments, or towards the larger market for ‘everyday products’? In the 
high-end segment the competitors were considered to be fish products, like smoked salmon 
and ‘gravlax’. In the segment for mundane everyday sandwich fillings, competitors would be 
various meat products, like salami, ham and pepperoni. Broadly speaking, these two 
competing suggestions about what the market for this invention would be, had been present 
from the very start. Thus, early in the process the project team went abroad to study food 
cultures and potential markets. Both the idea and a prototype of the product were presented to 
industrial firms in each of the visited countries. According to Mogård, who was responsible 
for the internationalization of the project, these very early market studies identified “areas in 
which such a product could work”, most likely within the fermentation traditions in Spain, 
Italy, Germany and in Asia, particularly Japan and Korea. These countries were also 
identified as markets with substantial purchasing power. 
 
The initial motivations that formed the vision and business plan for the Umi No Kami project 
were important for its direction, formatting its ‘framework conditions’. This was partly the 
result of the top-management’s decisions to buy the patent, formalize and fund the project, 
and partly due to the patent application itself: “One of the conditions that was very important 
was that we had to use white fish, mixed in with red fish. And then, when we started 
developing a communication platform and name, we talked a lot about ‘Sea Salami’, and all 
such ‘salmon’-things, right, but this was out of the question, as we would then be limited 
exclusively to salmon, and we could not do that” (Torvanger, Tine R&D/marketing). At the 
time, these preconditions were experienced as being rigidly stable and restrictive, and 
attempts at modifying the framing were not approved by the top-management. Later in the 
process, however, things could suddenly be changed. An increasing impatience within Tine’s 
management, combined with the initiation of a new relationship between Tine and Bremnes 
Seashore via   newly hired researchers - and a new raw material; pre-rigor salmon, changed 
the ‘rules of the game’.  
 
A new director, Hovland, was hired for the business unit now denoted Tine Biomarin, at a 
point when Tine had invested a great deal into agro-marine venture activities without seeing 
any signs of success. Although Tine Biomarin had a long-term perspective,  it was time to 
start demonstrating some commercial results. This was around the same time Swensen and a 
group of researchers were hired by Tine R&D. They soon learned they shared some common 
interests. Hovland interpreted his mission as being one of “cleaning up the mess”, i.e., 
structuring and organising the activities more efficiently, and evaluating what to do next. 
Swensen called this a ‘coup’ of the Umi No Kami project, in order to generate more 
momentum towards commercialisation. Moreover, the shift enabled a radical break with the 
original Umi No Kami concept. The result was a shift in the project, from being a R&D-based 
project to becoming a commercial venture. 
 
The original project group had feared Hovland’s scepticism to the entire project; that he 
would close it down as part of his task to restructure Tine’s bio-marine activities. But then 
Hovland was introduced to the pre-rigor salmon from Bremnes Seashore. This triggered 
enthusiasm and new hopes for the Umi No Kami project. The use of pre-rigor salmon in the 
recipe turned out to improve the technology, the texture and the taste. It was decided to 
remove white fish from the recipe, something the earlier project group had not been allowed 
to do. The framework conditions had changed. Tryggestad, who was a member of Tine’s 
board of directors, could confirm the story of ‘the coup’ and of impatience with the 
management regarding the Umi No Kami project. They were uncertain about whether the 
project should be pursued further, and if so, how? Hence, the shift was accepted as a 
‘necessary change’ due to the declining belief in the earlier approach among top-managers. 
Following this shift, the project team was radically altered, and the new commercialization 
manager, Kiland, soon went out to present the product internationally. With the new raw 
material, the innovation shifted to become a pure salmon-based product, called ‘Salma’.  
 
Large restaurant or catering actors were regarded the ‘ideal customers’ in this project,  
probably demanding fewer adaptations – and thus lower costs – particularly with regard to 
packaging and logistics. After conducting promising meetings in Asia with a multinational 
restaurant corporation, Salma was taken back to the laboratory. In order to bake well in a 
pizza oven, it needed less drying, probably no smoking, and could possibly accept lower 
quality standards; in other words, it could become a product that was easier, faster and thus 
cheaper to make. However, when returning to the company with the good news, nothing 
happened. Whether they had lost interest in the product, lacked trust in Tine, or if their contact 
person had gotten a new job, we do not know. Anyway, the prospect of what had been 
considered the ‘ultimate customer’ had reached its end. 
 
Next, Tine’s German agent became interested and wanted to test it in German hypermarkets. 
He soon put the initial, unsliced package out for sale in KaDeWe, Berlin’s huge and 
prestigious demonstration store for food products: “We had promotion women presenting it 
and giving it out to tasters, and in a few days we sold 10 cartons, 100 salamis. What we saw 
was that without tasting it and with very little knowledge among consumers, and a high price, 
it was very difficult. However, when people got to taste it, most liked it” (Martens, DM-Nor). 
Several lessons were learned in this German market test. First, customers required knowledge 
about the product: what it was, how to use it, its benefits compared to alternatives, etc. This 
had to be inscribed on the packages and presentation materials. Second, slicing the product 
and reducing its size would be beneficial. A new design and packaging for the German market 
was developed, and sizes were adjusted. Armoured with presentation materials, a suitable 
package, and a novel and branded product, Martens went to the retail chains with the product. 
Salma was ready for test sales in 90 German ‘hypermarkets’. But the sales of the ‘Lax Salami’ 
did not go particularly well. From this test, it was realised that Salma, in this form, had little 
chances of commercial success in German hypermarkets. Thus, one by one, the hypotheses 
about Salma’s market potential were rejected. 
 
4.3 How can hygiene be improved? 
While planning for the scaling up of production, a joint venture was established between Tine 
and Bremnes Seashore. Bremnes had the role of producing Salma, and processing facilities 
had to be built at their property. A discrepancy between the two companies on production 
practice already started to appear when buying machines. While Tine normally would buy 
brand new and high-end equipment, the management at Bremnes mainly bought used 
machines. When the production started, the difference also became apparent through their 
rather different routines related to hygiene; both during production and cleaning. The first 
problem that occurred had to do with mould. Suddenly, a couple of weeks into production, the 
entire batch of salmon salami in the drying facility was covered by mould. At the same time, 
Kiland had made plans for an international marketing tour, to be started just a few weeks 
later. This triggered an intense period of identifying and fixing the problem:  the technical 
facilities needed to be upgraded and adjusted, and the control routines were tightened. The 
second problem was related to microbiological activity within the product. Tine, who had a 
great deal of experience with the processing and distribution of fragile dairy products, was 
surprised by the low standards of the fish industry with regard to bacteria levels. This affected 
the shelf-life of the product, and hence costs and logistics. Tine R&D mobilized some of their 
biologists and production specialists to teach the Bremnes management and train its 
production and cleaning personnel, and after a few months of hard work they were able to 
reduce the total bacteria counts in the products by around 75 percent. In sum the main aspects 
of technology development, several intertwined technical and biological problems had to be 
solved before being able to produce the fish salami with the expected biological and 
nutritional quality.   
 
4.4 Do you want salmon salami or salmon loins? 
As hinted at in section 4.2, a competing hypothesis about the market was emerging in the 
Salma team: the idea that the prerigor salmon loins had their own commercial value and did 
not really need to be combined with the salami technology. By this time, Tine and Bremnes 
Seashore had invested quite significant amounts of time and money into the salmon salami 
project, and it was not uncontroversial to admit that the salami was difficult to sell, and that 
they should focus on the raw material instead. In visiting various marketing arenas, Kiland 
was continuously seeking to make sense of the project through meetings with customers, 
colleagues and partners. Sometimes, he was almost doubtful about the potential of selling the 
sausage at all: “If you have the best beef in the world, and then you mince it and make a 
sausage out of it, and you sell it for a high price, then you would think that you also could sell 
the beef. If you had started this from scratch, you would never have started with the line 
extension; you would have started with the salmon” (Kiland, Tine SA). In his customer 
presentations, he spoke first about the superior pre-rigor salmon filets as a prerequisite for the 
salami, and thereafter, he presented the salami. In the back of his mind, he had a feeling that 
the raw material, the pre-rigor salmon filets, could be easier to market and sell. This was 
clearly confirmed on several occasions by potential customers, so Kiland and Hovland 
gradually developed the argument for including a fresh salmon loin product under the Salma 
brand, and eventually succeeded in convincing the top-management in Tine to endorse this 
change of direction. 
 
Then Kiland brought his delicate packages of salmon loins to a high-end supermarket; Jakob’s 
in Oslo, and their fresh product manager immediately became interested. Within a couple of 
weeks, they were ready to start an introduction campaign in the store, which resulted in great 
sales for the new product. Jakob’s was associated with Norway’s largest retail chain; 
Norgesgruppen (controlling 40% of the Norwegian food retail market), which also got very 
interested. Tine already had a close relationship to this retail corporation through its dairy 
products. Soon a roll-out plan was launched to promote Salma Fresh in a number of its ‘Ultra’ 
and ‘Meny’ supermarkets. At the same time, several gourmet chefs had found Salma loin to 
be a great raw material, and became charismatic advocates for it. Suddenly, Salma was 
moving towards becoming a commercial success story. From this point the salami was no 
longer mentioned as part of the concept, at least not in public; the twisted path towards this 
success story was carefully being reconstructed and at least partly deleted. The stories about 
the roots of the Salma project stopped being represented. The research to figure out the receipt 
of a fermented fish sausage, the tremendous work to stabilize fatty acids, the role of milk 
proteins, etc were all moved aside and forgotten.   
 
5. An analytical model for innovation processes 
From oscillating between established theory and case study, we have developed a conceptual 
model for the study of innovation processes. We suggest that innovation processes may 
fruitfully be conceptualised as a dual process: After garnering attention for the innovative 
idea, and thus staging it for further exploration, a process of mobilising actor-networks, or 
getting the rights, alliances, space, time and resources to innovate is set in motion. This forms 
the basis for a process of knowledge exploration in formulating and testing propositions about 
reality, which also means interacting: because reality, people and things, often ‘speak back’. 
Thus, we suggest a bipolar model (figure 1), in which the particular dynamics between the 
two poles of a concrete innovation process become a central part of explaining that case.  
 
(Figure 1 here) 
 
Figure 1: An innovation process model.  
 
It is clear from our empirical research that the processes of exploration and mobilisation are 
neither completely separate, nor completely intertwined5
 
. How and when these sub-processes 
interact and the implications of this interaction seem to be important for understanding 
innovation processes. Sometimes these ‘sub-processes’ draw on each other. At other times, 
they do not interact at all, and at still other times, they confront each other – with potentially 
serious implications for the innovation. In addition, this dual process occurs within a network 
of interconnected processes (figure 2), which creates resistances and constraints, as well as 
enablers for innovation to move in certain directions rather than other. Hence, friction forces 
will always be present between the new and the old. 
From this model, we get two different perspectives on the time (and timing) of innovation 
processes: first, the time of a particular innovation process, and its ‘program of action’ 
(strategy, interests, and the reach of its relationships). Second, there is the heterogeneity of 
time frames present in the larger network (figure 2), related to all sorts of interacting 
processes (and their strategies, interests, and relationships), and to which the particular 
innovation process will have to connect in order to move towards realization. Although the 
particular innovation process will build its own path, and gradually become embedded in its 
own set of actors, resources and activities, it seems to be primarily within the larger network 
that it is likely to provoke a clash between the old and the new. The ability to adapt to the 
established network, with its ‘investments in place’, or ‘economic heaviness’, represents a 
crucial test for the innovation. Nevertheless, innovation is fundamentally about creating new 
                                                 
5 When we use the terms ‘process’ and ‘sub-process’, we do not mean to say that there is an objective ‘whole’ 
that may be divided into distinctive parts. Rather, as with most conceptual models and analytic frameworks, this 
is a matter of delimiting cases, research objects and research questions. What we call sub-processes in our case 
study may well have also been parts of other processes, serving other interests, and in fact this is part of our 
argument. The interconnecting or embedding of different processes with different time frames and different 
interests serves as a crucial challenge during the innovation process. The model depicts aspects of innovation 
processes, and does not refer to particular entities or actors, but rather to kinds of activities and processes and 
their logics. 
 
combinations and relations in space and time. Hence, there is a necessary gap to cross 
between the old and the new. Innovation inevitably takes the innovators further away from the 
established network practices and the heaviness of previous investments, thus leading to more 
open confrontations and greater challenges of both relating and adapting to what already 
exists. Thus, it becomes very clear, not only how difficult it may be to develop the innovation 
itself, but even more how complex it may be to realize and stabilize innovations in, or even 
worse, across, industrial networks.  
 
(Figure 2 here) 
 
Figure 2: Innovation processes, situated in networks of interconnected processes. 
 
The framework we suggest here did not emerge before the fieldwork; rather, it is an outcome 
of the combination of process-based theory and observations in the field, of recording these 
and trying to discriminate between what kind of activities and ‘sub-processes’ are happening 
in practice, and pairing them with the logic of an interaction process view. Below, we develop 
some theoretical implications.  
 
First, we need to ask whether a productive distinction can be made between these two 
processes of mobilising actor-networks and knowledge exploration. Is knowledge exploration 
also a matter of mobilising actor networks by negotiating socio-material relations?  If so, what 
is the difference between the two? Several of these activities, although analytically separable, 
actually interact with each other. Mobilisation of actor networks and activities may have more 
or less immediate influence on the exploration, and vice versa. However, it takes different 
tools, including skills, strategies and resources, to (1) recruit and mobilise elements, and (2) 
make them fit and hold together. Thus, we see two main processes inside developing an 
innovation, the first, called ‘mobilising actor-networks’, typically consists of the political 
activities of (re)presenting, convincing, forcing and negotiating. The second, ‘knowledge 
exploration’, consists of knowledge generation. This involves exploring and stabilising 
relations between elements, such as ideas, materials, technologies and procedures, as well as 
formulating propositions and testing them in practice.  
 
 
6. A theoretical interpretation of the case 
6.1 Staging of innovation processes 
The initiation of innovation processes, what we call ‘staging’, is when something happens 
somewhere: someone asks a question, investigates something or incidentally discovers an 
opportunity. In the case study we saw how new techno-scientific ideas emerged from curious 
experts through spanning the boundaries of their knowledge, facilitating interaction between 
actors such as Tine SA, and various elements from different epistemic and industrial fields. 
An idea emerges from the meeting of different perspectives, realities, knowledge and 
experience. As demonstrated in this case, technologists are often seeking to supplement 
technologies through re-combination or the idea emerges from the investigations into 
potential use of and markets for their inventions. At other times, it is marketers or customers 
who express a demand for a solution to some particular problem. At still other times, it may 
be managers who seek to renew their organisation. In this particular case the top-down 
development of Tine’s agro-marine innovation strategy clearly supported the bottom-up 
initiative of the R&D department. What all such situations share when initiating an innovation 
process, is that an idea has to be brought to attention, generate the interest of various actors 
and mobilise a minimum of resources spread through space and time. Sometimes it is 
necessary to stick with the initial question for a while before finding an opportunity to do 
something further with it, that is, stage a new process of exploration and mobilisation of 
resources (Spinosa et al., 1997). This cultivating of the ability to formulate questions beyond 
the present knowledge domain and industrial path is what Garud and Karnøe (2001) associate 
with the ability of ‘mindful deviation’.  
 
6.2 Mobilizing actor networks 
After formulating the question, putting it on the stage and generating some interest in it, the 
problem immediately arises of how to mobilise the time, space, actors and resources needed 
to start the innovation process. In our case study, Professor Slinde had to show that there was 
something to explore, through conducting initial experiments and making convincing 
presentations of the premature materialisation of the idea. Further, he had to enlist actors with 
money and expertise to participate in its further development, in this case by exploiting his 
established relationships with people within funding bodies, a technology transfer office and 
at his present and previous research institutes. However, this was not a one-time operation. 
Throughout many of the processes in this case study, the innovators repeatedly had to 
mobilise renewed support and more resources from their allies, and find new partners: Tine’s 
owners and management had to be convinced time after time that the project had potential. 
New employees were hired to improve the aquaculture knowledge in the project. Bremnes 
Seashore and their excellent raw materials were mobilized to advance both the product 
technology and the market potential. Finally, a number of market actors were recruited – or 
sought, such as the restaurant chain, the German hypermarkets, Jakob’s supermarket, and 
Norgesgruppen food retailing corporation. 
 
We also saw how a number of arguments were used, and how several actors were appointed 
as representatives for the project – or rather for the potential of the project. Most notably, this 
could be seen in the Umi No Kami business plan related to certain ‘food cultures’ and aiming 
for a huge international market success. Also, when mobilizing both the Tine and  Bremnes 
managements for including fresh salmon loins under the Salma brand (a French distributor 
was used as a possible buyer, along with anecdotes about certain positive responses from US 
retail purchasing managers). This is a pragmatic process: making the most of what one has in 
convincing and negotiating to expand the actor-network and access resources. Following the 
semiotic argument relatively coherent chains of arguments have to be constructed to mobilise 
time, resources and decisions. In addition, there is the work of enrolling and aligning a set of 
actors and resources into an ‘actor-network’, getting them to represent and support the project, 
and keeping them interested over time, while also doing the exploration work. The immature 
object has to be taken through several translations: from idea, to prototype, to research 
application, to patent application, to product, to use and exchange, etc. This partly depends on 
mobilisation of the actor network, the construction of meaning and the mobilisation of chains 
of trustworthy arguments.  
 
6.3 Knowledge exploration 
Exploration, on the other hand, is about testing whether these ideas and propositions hold up 
technically and in the market.  Is (or can we make) this idea technically feasible? Does it (or 
can we make it) fit within the distributor’s product categories? Does it (or can we make it) fit 
within the using practices of consumers? How much are they willing to (or can we make 
them) pay for it? When they have actually succeeded in mobilising some resources and 
convincing some people to give the idea a try, then they have to make it work in practice. This 
process of knowledge exploration, of ‘making things work’, involves a process of formulating 
and re-formulating propositions about the potential ‘reality’ of the innovation, and then testing 
them out in practice. It is a two step process: first of creatively imagining potential social and 
technical relations and then testing in practice whether – and in what way – such relations are 
possible. An analogy to this process would be that of the scientific method, of formulating a 
research question or a hypothesis, and conducting practical empirical experiments to see if an 
answer to the question can be found, or if the hypothesis may withstand the test. This is not a 
one-way street of actors seeking to impose their will onto others, but rather an interactive, or 
we could say, negotiated process. When testing a relationship between elements, e.g., between 
fish and fermentation culture, between proteins and fatty acids, or between salmon salami and 
its users, the innovator enters his own picture, so to speak, and becomes involved with – and a 
part of – the object. Thus, not only does the innovator test a relationship between elements, 
but the innovator himself experiences how the elements ‘speak back’, i.e., accept some 
relations while rejecting others.  
 
Moreover, this testing and making of relationships changes the innovation - often in 
unpredictable ways. Although it equips the innovator with some creativity and agency, 
innovation as a recombination of resources and restructuring of activity patterns is not a 
matter of the heroic entrepreneur’s unlimited agency. The proposed relationships between 
technical, social and economic elements have to be tested and negotiated, and then 
reformulated and renegotiated, often several times between the involved parties. Precisely 
because exploration starts out with imagination, and because the objects being explored 
‘speak back’ and bring in their own preferences, it is not possible to be sure whether – or how 
– the imagined recombination of elements might work. Knowledge exploration produces 
development risk, as there will always be uncertainties, and, in the case of more radical re-
combinations, the number of such uncertainties causes indefinite development risk. This part 
of the innovation process is about developing ‘chains of propositions’ – from testing whether 
a technology is feasible, to testing whether such a product will find paying users and hence 
produce economic value.  
 
6.4 Interaction and controversies between sub-processes 
However, as previously mentioned, the processes of mobilising others and of knowledge 
exploration are not fully separable. Sometimes ‘chains of power/arguments’ (mobilisation) 
and ‘chains of propositions’ (exploration) interact with each other; borrow elements from 
each other or confront each other’s aims and outcomes. This does not happen continuously. 
After mobilising a set of actors and resources and starting the exploration process for shorter 
or longer periods, there may be limited or even no interaction with the mobilisation process 
and the original idea and perceived opportunity. When observing such processes over time, 
we can see that there are discrepancies between what was agreed upon in the mobilization of 
decisions and resources, and what actually ends up being explored and realized, whether they 
be technical or commercial issues. Yet, when resources run out and new resources have to be 
mobilised, or when allies start getting impatient (i.e. the management at Tine), or are 
disappointed (i.e. Bremnes management and Tine R&D), the exploration process may be 
confronted for its lack of progress, its departure from the original vision or its need to reorient 
towards enrolling other and different actors and resources, as in our case study. Such 
confrontations between the mobilized idea network and the actual exploration/realization 
process will often threaten the whole project, and if it is allowed to continue, it is likely to 
change direction. 
 
Discoveries and knowledge generated in the exploration process may challenge the mobilised 
actors to rethink and change their ideas, interests and participation, thereby supporting the 
project in exploring new directions and propositions. The ways in which such interactions and 
confrontations come about and what they lead to should be of particular interest to researchers 
of industrial innovation, as this would reveal some of the generative and limiting dynamics of 
innovation processes. Where new meanings are negotiated, choices have to be made and new 
courses of action pointed out.  
 
7. Theoretical implications 
7.1 Contrary forces 
By constructing and amplifying the distinction between mobilisation and exploration in a 
bipolar model like this, we find that we can explain some of the micro-dynamics of 
innovation processes from an angle that, to the best of our knowledge, has not yet been 
sufficiently described in the literature. First, during (sub-)processes of mobilisation, actor-
networks are recruited and committed to things with which they are initially unfamiliar: an 
idea, a prospect or a prototype of something that may or may not become feasible and usable. 
Yet, to enable mobilisation, a degree of certainty has to be presumed. Second, during the (sub-
)processes of knowledge exploration, the aim is to create knowledge – to explore the object 
and its potential – and therefore change is unavoidable. Moreover, this process of generating 
knowledge tends to multiply the alternatives of the object, and hence increase, rather than 
decrease, the uncertainty/complexity – or development risk – of the project. Mobilisation and 
exploration are contrary forces in this model, and sometimes it almost appears as if the 
innovation process is at war with itself. Whereas mobilisation is directed towards aligning 
interests and reducing risk, exploration is directed towards formulating and testing 
propositions about reality. While mobilisation seeks to converge, exploration frequently leads 
to divergence for the innovation. This suggests a revision of Van de Ven et al’s (1999) model 
that depicts divergence and convergence as sequential parts of the innovation process. 
Divergence and convergence should instead be analyzed as the effects of contrary forces 
within the innovation process, sometimes sequentially following each other, but more often 
running in parallel and leading to friction when they interact. Finally, the interaction between 
mobilisation and exploration processes on the one hand, and between different actor-
networks/organising processes on the other, often leads to controversies and compromises that 
may send the project off in new directions. This means that innovation outcomes are never 
given ‘by the order of things’, but instead are the result of a series of negotiations and 
knowledge explorations over time. 
 
7.2 Uncertainty, knowledge and power 
The presence of a number of uncertainties – ‘nobody knows’ problems – frequently produces 
high development risk in innovation projects. Although they are experts in their respective 
fields, we argue that the innovators lack of knowledge has to do with the connection and 
translation of knowledge and technology between settings. In putting knowledge and 
knowledge constraints at the centre of attention, the framework suggests that innovators have 
to produce two different kinds of activities. First, to gather a chain of arguments suited for 
convincing, mobilising, maintaining and removing parts of actor-networks and their 
resources. Second, they need to produce testable propositions about reality, e.g. how to make 
the technology work and what users might have an interest in such a product.  
 
Innovation processes are propositional at their core. The original idea is a proposition about 
the potential that may stem from a new combination of elements. This idea needs some 
resources to get started, and then the idea needs to be explored in practice – testing whether 
and how the proposition may hold. This will normally happen by breaking the original idea 
into a series of new and ‘smaller’ propositions; as the innovation is opened up and 
investigated, it is revealed as being a more or less complex set of problems, all having many 
different solutions in potentia. However, in order to enlist allies, it is necessary to make the 
idea and concept converge on a number of aspects, and this will often create a ‘lock-in’ for 
the subsequent process – at least for a period of time.  
 
The mobilisation of actor-networks is based on a relational logic of ‘power production’, i.e., 
of carefully building, or connecting to, networks of human and non-human elements with 
interests in realising the innovation. In this sense, this part of the process is about producing 
power effects, i.e., mobilising actors and resources on behalf of the innovation, and translating 
their interests into a common project. Still, if and when an actor-network is mobilised, the 
elements employed in the chain of arguments may produce frames and evaluation principles 
that define the project’s room for action. Hence, temporal lock-ins may be enforced that 
cannot be easily broken out of in the subsequent parts of the innovation process.  
 
In the interaction between potential allies during efforts to stage and mobilise resources for 
innovation, space and time is created for the exploitation of knowledge uncertainty. Different 
actors have different experiences and expertise related to the characteristics and potential of 
the elements recombined into a new idea, and they are situated within different sets of 
relationships. However, few – if any – know what it takes to relate previously unrelated 
elements to each other. During the process of building arguments to convince others to 
support an innovation, presumptive competent actors are mobilised to represent the 
innovation as something worth pursuing. However, a part of this is also that asymmetrical 
knowledge and experience may be used by the more informed and experienced actor to 
influence – and sometimes manipulate – the other. Such manipulation is obviously also about 
mobilising apparent, at least temporal authority. Hence, if more ‘radical’ ideas will be 
impossible to evaluate in objective terms, those who have more experience with some of the 
elements involved may be able to exploit actors with less or other types of experience. 
Choices regarding innovative ideas always have to be made based on limited knowledge. 
 
7.3 The learning paradox 
Uncertainty, or the lack of knowledge, in innovation is a problem that calls for ‘exploration’: 
an active learning process of testing and developing the innovation. The exploration process is 
supposed to move asymptotically towards solid knowledge. The paradox is that while the aim 
of exploration processes is to produce knowledge, they almost always produce complexity, 
multiplicity, ambiguity and choice. Even if the knowledge generating process occasionally 
succeeds in providing clear and singular answers, most of the time in this case study the 
object and its complex potential relations expanded during exploration. This has partly to do 
with the innovation, at least in its early phases, being unstable within several dimensions, and 
that its stabilisation requires exploration of a number of interconnected issues. In addition, 
when experts start investigating an idea, making it into an ‘epistemic object’ (Knorr Cetina, 
2001), that idea opens up and becomes a complex of interesting problems and opportunities. 
Paradoxically, in industrial settings, exploration is a process that aims to expand and 
generalise the concept, which often involves hypotheses about appropriation and economies 
of scale. The innovation has to be brought towards stabilisation as a general concept and thus 
be possible to scale up. This presupposes that the concept is both tested in practice, and 
demonstrated to hold up to such tests.  
 
7.4 Time and simplification  
A main point in our analytic scheme is that, for longer periods of time, processes of 
mobilisation and exploration do not interact, and when they do interact, controversies in the 
form of frictions and confrontations are often produced. Learning often leads to a departure 
from the original idea, which may create a mismatch to the extent that a struggle over the 
future direction is unavoidable. Therefore, interaction avoidance seems to be a common 
challenge of innovation processes, basically stemming from the need to handle and reduce the 
divergent and expanding aspect of exploration. Actors tend to avoid interacting with others 
during exploration processes due to the risk of being influenced. Moreover, the battles that 
innovators engage in are only the ones they think they can win. This is, so to speak, creating 
parallel space and time, where rather different conceptions of the innovation may emerge 
alongside each other. We also saw in the case study that after a successful mobilisation, 
creating new space and time for the next phase, the resulting framework is kept tight until new 
confrontations and reconfigurations enforce or enable a renegotiation of either the framework 
conditions or the actual innovation. 
 
Not only do sub-processes of innovation sometimes interact, the innovation process also 
interacts within a larger network of interconnected processes (see figure 2 above), thereby 
considerably increasing complexity and uncertainty. We suggest that, based on a process 
perspective, path dependence is better understood as encompassing relatively slower 
processes maintained via intertwined networks of heterogeneous elements that are carefully 
assembled over long periods of time. Movement in such embedded networks creates friction, 
which is both a creative and a destructive force. Friction privileges continuations and 
incremental changes of the existing practice in both the direction of improvements across 
interfaces and the direction of economizing in a way that gradually adapts the new activity to 
the requirements of the surrounding economy. This view of path dependence explains both 
some of the slowness and some of the unexpected outcomes of innovation processes: (1) why 
innovation processes tend to take significantly more time than expected, and (2) why 
‘successful’ innovations often are realised as incremental changes or marginal additions to an 
existing set of relations and activities.  
 
Building the innovation into commercial relations is likely to de-stabilise it and produce new 
phases of development, both of mobilisation and exploration. Hence, finding or creating use 
for the innovation by others means that the innovation needs renegotiation. As mentioned 
previously, confrontations between mobilisation and exploration are often destructive; thus, 
actors avoid involving themselves in more relations than necessary, and a simplification of 
networks might be required. Further, while sometimes necessary, this reluctance to interact 
may again lead to sub-optimal mobilisation or exploration. When partially stabilised 
innovations and their internal propositions about users are tested with potential users, new 
propositions and adaptations of the established setting will arise, and thus lead to new 
development phases and new selection processes. In order to minimise such challenges, and 
thereby reduce development costs, businesses are forced to radically simplify the innovation 
and its network, and adapt to what already exists in response to friction forces within the 
established network. 
 
8. Conclusions 
This study has indicated that in order to expand our understanding of innovation processes, 
we need to address more precisely how the “physical processes of time”, that we associate 
with the emergence of new products and new business activities, relates to different mental 
and social processes of time and the divergent activities these tend to generate. Mobilizing 
processes has to do with particular kinds of interactions between mental and social processes 
on the one hand, and resource related processes on the other, that are both communicative and 
economic of nature.  The outcomes of such processes are typically “commitments” to the 
innovation projects. Knowledge exploration processes on the other hand, has to do with the 
search for correspondences between mental propositions and the realities as represented by a 
variety of feedback processes to the various dimensions and features of the proposed 
innovation. The outcomes of such processes are new pieces of knowledge and understanding 
that move the innovation in different directions. The innovation management process can 
accordingly be seen as an interacted agency activity over time that incorporates these 
divergent activities. To align and realign contradictory forces is at the core of what innovation 
managers do. 
 
In sum, we maintain that this study has contributed to our understanding of industrial 
innovation processes by challenging and complementing perspectives of punctuated learning 
(Van de Ven et al., 1999), path creation (Garud & Karnøe, 2001) and user-producer 
interaction (Håkansson & Waluszewski, 2007; Pinch & Oudshoorn, 2008). The analytic 
model and subsequent theorising is consistent with the methodology of actor-network theory, 
IMP’s view of resources and recent developments within innovation studies. However, our 
study differs from many accounts and conceptions within actor-network theory in its attempt 
to handle industrial innovation rather than science and technology development. It also differs 
from the related and emergent field of the sociology of finance (Callon, 1999; Knorr Cetina & 
Preda, 2005) in dealing with ‘less pure’ settings thus we have found reason to combine it with 
important insights from the IMP approach.  
 
We have emphasised the controversies of innovation as being confrontations within the actual 
process, and between the innovation process and its related network of interconnected 
processes, as well as (indirect) friction forces within the already existing business network. 
Confrontation refers partly to the occasional interactions between the mobilized network and 
any actual learning that takes place within the process over time. It also partly refers to the 
effects of interaction between the old and the new, between the ‘investments in place’ and the 
innovative solution. When something new is introduced to a setting, confrontations often 
arise, as the new element tends to confront power constructions and established practices. 
This may produce blockages by some actors, and mobilization efforts by others. Therefore, 
over time the innovation will repeatedly have to align with new elements in order to maintain 
or gain power. Friction refers to the indirect effects of the innovation programme. When the 
new intervenes with the old, there will be forces and counter-forces activated between the 
existing interdependent resources, sometimes triggering creative efforts of problem solving, 
while other times serving as an obstacle. Based on the assumption that resources are 
heterogeneous and interdependent, Håkansson and Waluszewski (2001) have conceptualised 
how investments in place represent ‘economic heaviness’, which produces resistance, or 
‘friction’ (Håkansson & Waluszewski, 2001). This mechanism tends to favour incremental 
innovation, and requires innovation projects to work hard to adapt the new to the old. Friction 
frequently also leads to unintended consequences because all network elements are 
embedded. 
 
We maintain in this study that it is productive to business network research to explicitly open 
up the black box of innovation processes. Innovations will have to find their places within and 
among established business structures, which can also be described by business network 
concepts that are able to deal with and explain various dynamics. Still, studying innovations 
offers opportunities for investigating the more radical creation processes that are less stable, 
less material and more controversial than businesses that have already proven themselves by 
practice.  
 
For further research, we suggest that there is a need to test and tune process-based models, 
like the one presented in this paper, in more settings. This could take place at more ‘strategic 
levels’ of organisations, or within various other industries, which would enable a testing of 
the model’s relevance, as well as a comparison of innovation processes across industries. 
Furthermore, the relevance of the model in settings of both service innovation and 
entrepreneurship has not been discussed in this paper, and we would be curious to learn about 
the differences that would appear if this were done. We think that the insights produced from 
the analysis of this case study are not exhaustive. At the level of detail provided within the 
empirical descriptions, more could be gained than we have been able to offer in this paper. In 
particular, we suggest that it would be interesting to identify more of the various strategies 
used for coping with the controversy and interaction: first, between the mobilising of actor-
networks and the exploration of knowledge, and second, between the innovation process and 
the network of interconnected processes in which it is situated. 
 
From a pragmatic business perspective, we believe the suggested model and the findings we 
have presented could serve as a useful framework for managers to interpret, communicate and 
structure their efforts in dealing with or managing innovation projects and processes. This 
model is a way of making sense of such complex activities, and might help in the structuring 
of a critical and analytical examination of what characterizes innovation processes and their 
relationships to the broader business networks from which they emerge. Particularly 
important are the study’s implications for policy, specifically the idea that public support for 
industrial innovation should not isolate its criteria to the innovation project in itself, nor to the 
innovating organizations’ immediate environment/network. Rather, it should seek to greatly 
emphasize the capacities of the innovation actors and network to adapt the innovation to their 
larger networks. 
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